Dropping 5,000-pound bunker busters is the kind of move that sounds “surgical” in a briefing and feels like gasoline when you zoom out. I get the logic. I also think it’s the kind of logic that can trap you: you hit the thing you can see, and you create the problem you can’t.
Based on what’s been shared publicly, US forces struck underground missile sites near the Strait of Hormuz using GBU-57 “Massive Ordnance Penetrator” bunker busters. The stated idea is straightforward: take away Iran’s ability to use ballistic missiles in a moment where Iran has threatened to block the strait, a choke point for global oil shipping. This is happening in a conflict that started in late February and is now in its third week.
Those are the facts as reported. Now the part that matters: what does this mean?
To me, this looks like an attempt to buy control of the calendar. If you believe Iran is serious about choking the strait—or even just wants the world to believe it might—then taking out underground missile capacity is a way of saying: you don’t get to set the terms, and you don’t get a clean shot at retaliation if you try. It’s deterrence with a hammer.
But there’s a cost to hammer logic. Once you use a weapon designed for deeply buried targets, you’re sending a message that isn’t just “don’t block shipping.” You’re also saying, “we can reach what you thought was protected.” That changes the emotional temperature on the other side. It pushes leaders toward proving they’re not afraid. It can also push them toward tools that are harder to preempt.
People love to talk about “degrading capabilities” as if war is a spreadsheet. You remove Column A, so Row B can’t happen. In real life, opponents don’t politely stop. They route around.
Imagine you’re an Iranian commander and you just watched underground sites get hit. Do you now keep your most important assets in the same kind of sites, or do you spread them out? Do you rely on missiles that need fixed launch infrastructure, or do you lean into smaller, cheaper options that can pop up anywhere? Do you decide the safest retaliation isn’t a big dramatic strike, but lots of small actions that are deniable and constant?
That’s why I’m uneasy about calling this “effective” in any lasting way. It might be effective at destroying a specific set of facilities. It might even be effective at stopping a near-term missile response. But it can also be effective at convincing Iran that the only safe options are the messy ones.
And the Strait of Hormuz is exactly the kind of place where “messy” gets expensive fast. You don’t need a full blockade to create panic. You just need enough disruption—real or rumored—that insurers flinch, shipping schedules slip, and energy prices jump. If you’re a family trying to plan a budget, you’ll feel that. If you run a business that depends on transport and fuel, you’ll feel that. If you’re a politician, you’ll feel it in the polls.
There’s also a moral and strategic tension here that people should admit out loud: preventing a blockade is a legitimate goal, but preemptive strikes are a slippery habit. It’s one thing to say “we’re protecting global shipping.” It’s another to normalize “we will hit deep targets first because we believe you might do X.” The more that becomes standard, the more every country starts to justify first blows as “defensive.”
To be fair, there’s a strong counterargument: waiting is worse. If Iran truly has the ability and intent to threaten the strait, then letting that sit is basically inviting a global hostage situation. In that view, hitting missile sites now is the least bad option, because it reduces the odds that a future crisis becomes unmanageable. I understand that. I’m not pretending there’s a clean choice here.
But I keep coming back to incentives. If the goal is to stop Iran from messing with the strait, does this push them away from that plan—or does it convince them they need a bigger, more shocking move to restore deterrence? If you take away someone’s “credible threat,” they may feel they need to prove they still have one. And if the conflict is already three weeks in, we’re past the phase where everyone is calmly backing down.
There’s another angle people skip: what does “underground missile sites” actually cover? How many sites? How confident is the targeting? What happens if the strike is tactically successful but politically useless, because the other side can still cause disruption with different tools? The public rarely gets those details, and that uncertainty matters because it’s where overconfidence lives.
So yes, the strikes may reduce one form of risk while increasing another. They may protect shipping lanes while raising the odds of a wider, longer fight. They may help in the next 72 hours and hurt in the next 72 days.
If you’re cheering this because you want strength, you should be honest about the price tag and the possibility of blowback. If you’re condemning it because you hate escalation, you should be honest about what you’d do if the strait really were about to be choked and the world’s supply lines were on the line.
What level of disruption to the Strait of Hormuz is worth risking a bigger war to prevent?